Introduction
Reports submitted under these new regulations will be assessed in accordance with the Safety Report Handling, Assessment and Review Principles & Processes (SHARPP) manual, which covers guiding principles, procedures and assessment criteria. Those criteria include information on the safety management system, description of the establishment, predictions about the consequences of major accidents, and technical risk reduction measures.
The purpose of this paper is to provide some basic information about the indicators for which HSE Inspectors will be looking when they assess COMAH safety reports. It is mainly about the assessment criteria which
The COMAH Regulations
The Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 (COMAH) , which came into force on 1 April, place duties on operators subject to the Regulations to notify the Competent Authority (the HSE and the Environment Agency for England and Wales; and the HSE and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency for Scotland) of their activities; to take all measures necessary for the prevention and mitigation of major accidents; to prepare a major accident prevention policy and to report major accidents.
In addition, operators of sites where are relevant to control and power engineers.
Technical assessment criteria
The purpose of the technical criteria is to help us assess whether the report demonstrates: (a) that the necessary measures have been taken to prevent major accidents; and (b) that adequate safety and reliability have been incorporated into the design, construction, operation and maintenance. The first demonstration' requires information about the technical parameters and equipment used for the safety of the installation. Your safety report should show how the measures taken will prevent the foreseeable failures which could lead to major accidents. It should identitY how each risk-reduction measure contributes to the defence against each hazardous event. These measures may take the form of hardware systems, software systems or human systems. However, it is important that the performance specified for the riskreduction measures should be related the quantities of dangerous substances exceed the higher thresholds (top-tier establishments) must submit safety reports and prepare and test emergency plans. COMAH also places duties on the Competent Authority to communicate the conclusions of safety report assessments to operators; prohibit activities if there are serious deficiencies in measures for prevention and mitigation of major accidents; to have inspection systems and programmes, carry out inspections and investigate accidents; and to designate certain sites as 'domino effects' establishments.
to realistic scenarios. The measures and their contribution to the overall reduction in risk should be described in sufficient detail for a third party to assess their relevance.
The second demonstration requires information about equipment installed to limit the consequences. Your safety report should show how adequate safety and reliability have been built into the design, construction, operation and maintenance of the installation. Modification of the plant is not covered in this paper.
Design
Design includes conceptual design, plant layout, process design and detailed design of equipment. Your report should show how the principles of redundancy, diversity, separation and segregation have been applied to reduce the risk of common-mode or common-cause failure and to ensure the availability of support systems (e.g. a battery back-up to an essential power supply). You should also address the behaviour of equipment on failure and include events which may cause a fault and disable protective systems.
The design stage in an instal1ation's life presents the best opportunity to reduce risk; and the use of a hierarchical approach to the selection of measures, as shown below, will help to ensure that precedence is given to those measures which avoid major accidents. o Mitigation Measures are taken to reduce the consequences of a major accident once it has occurred.
Operating Limits
Your safety report should show that adequate safeguards have been provided to protect the plant against excursions beyond design conditions. Normal operating limits are set to ensure that a suitable margin is present between normal operating conditions and the safe operating limits. Control systems (manual and automatic) are the first line of defence against excursions beyond normal operating limits. However, the primary function of a control system is usually economic (i.e. it is intended to ensure that the plant operates efficiently and produces a product that is within specification).
Alarm systems usually detect excursions beyond normal operating limits (using sensors that mayor may not be entirely independent of the control system) and alert the operator, who takes remedial action.
Safe operating limits are determined primarily by the process design and material specification, but are influenced by the age and condition of the plant and equipment. Where a control or alarm system has a role in the defence against excursions beyond the safe operating limits, it should be assessed as a safety-related control system.
Safety-related Control Systems
Your safety report should describe how safety-related control systems have been designed to ensure safety and reliability.
Any safety-related control system which is required to prevent or limit the consequences of a major accident -whether to people or the environment -should be designed in accordance with an appropriate code or standard. This should include an identification and consideration of all the components and devices in the system that need to function to ensure safety. The evidence presented in your report should show that the complete system (from sensor to final element, including any software) has been considered.
Your report should show how an appropriate level of safety integrity in the design of the safety-related control and protective systems has been determined. The level of safety integrity should be based on the required level of risk reduction, which will be related to the risk of a major accident and the reduction in risk achieved by other measures in place. The evidence presented should identifY the performance standards used for safety-related systems, and show how they have been derived from the risk assessment.
Your safety report should show how the required safety integrity has been achieved. This may include the use of accepted good practice, codes and standards, etc, and the appropriate application of redundancy, diversity, separation and segregation to safeguard against the risks of commoncause failure. This should include both hardware, software and human interfaces.
Your report should identifY how the following have been identified and accounted for in the design: (a) safe operating limits and their relation to the set points for safety functions, including the selection of an appropriate measurement and accuracy of instrumentation; (b) independence and separation from other systems or the initiating faults which require their operation. If the safety-related control systems are not separate from other equipment, the safety report should show that failures of connected equipment cannot affect the safety function and single-point failures cannot result in the failure of both systems. If this cannot be shown, the connected equipment or system should be regarded as being part of the safety related control system. (c) operating conditions, including start-up and shutdown and unusual operating conditions, e.g. single train operations; (d) operating duty including shut-off requirements for valves and how their performance will be affected by the presence of corrosive or erosive conditions; (e) inspection and maintenance requirements, including provision of facilities for carrying out proof testing; (t) environmental considerations, including requirements to operate in flammable atmospheres, equipment which requires special environments, prevention and consideration of electromagnetic interference, weather, etc.
Your safety report should identify support systems and back-up measures for the control and protective systems, including their component parts (e.g. power supplies or pneumatic systems). Evidence should be presented to show that support systems and back-up measures have adequate safety and reliability.
Utilities
One aspect of design which may not be given enough attention is the reliability, availability and survivability of utilities. Failure of a utility, e.g. water, air, steam, electricity (including power surge or partial loss), often results in a process upset, and may have effects across the entire establishment. Utilities that are needed to implement any measure defined in the safety report should have suitable reliability, availability and survivability.
Human Factors
The safety report should show how systems which require human interaction have been designed to be reliable and take into account the needs of the user.
Your safety report should show how human factors have been accounted for in the design of equipment and operating, maintenance and modification of systems. This should include consideration of: how human errors can be reduced; the role of management systems in reducing human errors; identification of the safety implications of human errors; and what back-up systems are in place.
Systems for Identifying Locations Where Flammable Substances Could Be Present
Your safety report should describe the systems for identifying locations where flammable substances could be present and how the equipment has been designed to take account of the risk.
You should identify the system whereby hazardous (flammable and explosive atmosphere) areas have been identified and classified. This may have been via an area classification study in which areas where a hazard exists owing to the normal, occasional or accidental release of process materials to atmosphere have been designated in accordance with recognised standards.
Sources of ignition for flammable atmospheres may include electrical equipment, naked flame or hot surfaces, static electrical discharge, etc. Your report should indicate how the likely sources of ignition have been considered in the design (e.g. electrical equipment selection for defined hazardous areas, avoidance of hot surfaces or naked flames or sparks associated with equipment such as through the use of spark arrestors, etc, control of static electrical build-up).
Radio-frequency radiation may cause an ignition hazard. The safety report should indicate whether there are strong radio transmitters in the vicinity, or whether the process includes devices which are particularly sensitive to radio-frequency radiation, e.g. manufacture of explosive detonators.
Equipment selected for use in hazardous areas should be suitable for use in such areas under all foreseeable operating conditions (including normal operation, start-up, shutdown, emergency, cleaning, or any other expected condition throughout the life of the installation).
Construction
Construction includes the manufacture, installation, construction of civil structures, testing, initial inspection and commissioning.
Your report should show how adequate safety and reliability have been built into the construction of the installation to prevent major accidents, and how the installation has been constructed to appropriate standards to prevent major accidents and reduce loss of containment.
You should show that construction of plant and associated equipment is managed to ensure that it is built in accordance with the design intent. Suitable evidence might include, for example, the mechanisms used to confirm the safety of all elements of control systems including valves, instruments, software, trips and alarms.
Operation
Operation includes plant start-up, shutdown, normal operation and emergency shutdown.
The safety report should show that safe operating procedures have been established and are documented for all reasonably foreseeable conditions (including start-up and shutdown and abnormal operating conditions). It should identify how reviews of operating procedures are undertaken and recorded to take account of operational experience or changing conditions in the plant.
During the operational life of the plant there may be temporary constraints in force -for example, the use of overrides and the use of procedures covering abnormal operation, or covering start-up and shutdown. Your safety report should show how these operational constraints are applied and managed to ensure safety.
Maintenance
Maintenance includes preventive maintenance, repair, replacement, periodic examination by a competent person and the assessment of any defects found.
Your safety report should show that the maintenance procedures are sufficiently comprehensive to maintain the plant and equipment in a safe state. It should also show that maintenance actIvIties will not compromise the safety of the installation, and that maintenance staff will not be exposed to unacceptable risks.
The safety report should identify those plant items and systems for which maintenance is considered to be a safety critical activity. Evidence should be provided to justify the maintenance strategy adopted. This evidence may include for example: (a) the maintenance of utilities systems (e.g. electricity distribution) or ancillary equipment (e.g. pumps), where failure may lead directly to a hazardous situation; (b) arrangements for the proof testing of all safety-related control system elements (e.g. sensors, transmitters, actuators, alarms, trips, confirmation of software modification number, etc) to reveal any faults which are not otherwise revealed during normal operation; (c) arrangements for the maintenance of control and instrumentation systems; (d) inspection and maintenance of electrical earthing and lightning protection systems, particularly in hazardous environments (e.g. explosives manufacture).
Your safety report should show that the impact of maintenance work on the safety of the installation has been adequately considered. Suitable evidence may describe, for example, the use of overrides in safety systems.
Your safety report should identify the procedures that are necessary to enable maintenance activities to be carried out safely to prevent a major accident. Safe systems of work should have been established so that all activities which could result in dangerous situations are or can be identified. Suitable evidence may refer to: (a) hazards posed by electrical equipment and the procedures for making safe; (b) hazards associated with hot work and procedures for assessing the risk, or testing for flammable gases; (c) hazards associated with underground services, and procedures for keeping contractors informed about such services in the area in which they are working.
Your safety report should identify which activities are subject to a Permit to Work System and describe the systems in use on your establishment. Suitable evidence should show how controls and limitations are placed on the maintenance activitysuch as safe working procedures, location of work, type of work, extent of work, competence of personnel and time. The safety report should show how all personnel involved in maintenance activities are made aware of the conditions and limitations of the Permit to Work System.
Where equipment has been certified by a third party (e.g. suitable for use in a flammable atmosphere), the safety report should justify how the maintenance system ensures the level of safety of that equipment (for example, by maintaining to standards, in accordance with manufacturers' instructions, etc).
Conclusions
The SHARPP manual was used in a pilot exercise in 1998 where the object was to find out how the procedures and the assessment criteria worked in practice. The feedback generated by that, and the consultation exercise, was used in the review of the manual. In the short term, Inspectors will largely draw on their knowledge and experience as they assess each report, but in the longer term it is likely that guidance will be produced in those areas where people seem to be having problems.
Few, ifany, of the tasks described in this paper could be regarded as additional requirements placed on companies and their staff. A company which is running its plant to be safe so far as is reasonably practicable will already have considered the hazard scenarios, and the measures to be adopted to minimise the risk of those hazards occurring.
The main difference between CIMAH and COMAH is the latter's requirement that the report should demonstrate that those measures are adequate.
Not all criteria will apply to every installation, and one of the assessor's tasks will be to decide which criteria apply, and how important each is to the overall assessment. We believe that the assessment criteria as they currently stand will enable us to assess safety reports with the right balance of consistency and flexibility. This paper contains editorial differences to the paper 'Assessment Criteria, an Overview', which was first published as one of the papers at an lEE colloquium on 'Control of Major Accidents and Hazards Directive: Implications for Electrical and Control Engineers'.
